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Cubism and Kant 
 
Dan O’Brien1 
Oxford Brookes University 
  
ABSTRACT. Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler (1920), Picasso’s dealer and early 
authority on cubism, interpreted Picasso, Braque and Gris as Kantian in their 
approach. In §1 I provide an introduction to cubism and to Kahnweiler’s use 
of Kantian terminology to distinguish analytic and synthetic cubism. §2 
concerns the ‘idealist’ interpretation of cubism in which the works are seen as 
attempting to depict Kantian things-in-themselves. I argue that this 
interpretation betrays a misunderstanding of Kant and it is at odds with 
Picasso’s pluralism. In §3 I suggest an alternative Kantian interpretation of 
cubism, one that draws on Kant’s empirical realism and the cognitive input 
that is necessary for experience. In §4 this is contrasted with the two-aspect 
reading of transcendental idealism. Lastly, in §5, I acknowledge that the 
major cubists had limited or no knowledge of Kant, but nevertheless argue 




Since the Renaissance artists have attempted to represent how things look 
from a particular, one-point, perspective. The picture frame can be seen as 
holding a transparent sheet through which viewers look, and from which, 
behind the painting, the scene recedes. Cubists reject such an ‘illusionist’ 
approach since, according to George Braque, ‘[i]t is simply a trick—a bad 
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trick—which makes it impossible for an artist to convey a full experience of 
space, since it forces the objects in a picture to disappear away from the 
beholder instead of bringing them within his reach, as painting should’ 
(Verstegen, 2014, p. 294). Further, it is a misrepresentation of what we 
actually see. Such perspective assumes that the viewer is motionless, that 
their vision consists of input to a single eye, and that everything in the visual 
field is in focus. In contrast, cubist works represent simultaneously the 
shapes and surfaces of objects from different perspectives. Objects are 
‘analysed’ in terms of facets at shallow angles to the picture surface, and 
they do not recede from the eye. In a series of drawings by Juan Gris, 
starting with The Eggs (1911), one can sense traditional perspective 
beginning to fracture, with the journey to full-blown cubism culminating in 
Bottles and Knife (1912).2 (That same precariousness can be sensed in 
cubism itself: holding sway for a few short years, shimmering, briefly, 
before it fragmented into futurism, constructivism, abstraction and the rest.) 
Gris is usually considered to be the third serious cubist, along with Picasso 
and Braque. The latter are often distinguished from ‘salon’ cubists such as 
Fauconnier, Gleizes and Metzinger; ‘salon’ was intended pejoratively since 
they exhibited at the Salon des Indépendants, an annual exhibition avoided 
by Picasso and Braque, in favour of Kahnweiler’s commercial gallery. Salon 
                                                          
2 Reproductions of the artworks I discuss are now just a click away, and so I 
recommend viewing the images to which I refer as you read through the paper. Title and 
date should suffice to locate an open access version. I will provide further bibliographic 
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cubists were widely disparaged: ‘their appreciation of true cubism was 
barely skin-deep and they employed a timid sort of faceting and cubification 
as a pictorial system’ (Cooper, 1971, p. 127). 
Cubists employed various techniques to realise, in Braque’s phrase 
above, a ‘full experience of space’. The emphasis on volumes led cubists 
away from the eye and visual appearances to tactile experience of reality. 
The subject matter of their paintings were things that you wanted to touch. 
Braque explained that his still lives evoked ‘tactile space’ (Verstegen, 2014, 
p. 293): there are tables with newspapers to leaf through, musical 
instruments to grasp and pluck. Braque, always more willing to articulate 
the approach than Picasso, says: ‘It isn’t enough to make visible what one 
paints; it must also become tangible. A still-life ceases to be a still-life the 
moment it can no longer be reached with the hand’ (Gantefuhrer-Trier, 
1996, p. 42). Volume is also given by ‘passage’: ‘The merging of planes 
with space by leaving one edge unpainted or light in tone’ (Richardson, 
1996, p. 97). Objects are tipped so volumes can be seen from within. There 
is no vanishing point in cubist works, no destination behind the transparent 
screen towards which one’s eye is led; one’s eye, rather, is loosely directed 
by the artist to rove over roof and table tops.  
There is a sense, then, in which cubist paintings are sculptural. Picasso 
did turn to sculpture, but, at least at first, the results were a less radical 
departure from the canon. His Head of a Woman (1909–10) is more or less a 
traditional bust, albeit with distortions. Radical departures, though, were to 
come. Carving was replaced by the construction of cubist guitars and glasses 
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pointillist dots, and paint applied to works to inhibit the natural effects of 
shadow. Julio Gonzalez, friend, welding teacher, and collaborator with 
Picasso on sculpture projects, emphasizes the sculptural nature of Picasso’s 
cubist paintings: ‘With these paintings it is only necessary to cut them out—
the colours are the only indications of different perspectives, of planes 
inclined from one side or the other—then assemble them according to the 
indications given by the colour, in order to find oneself in the presence of a 
“sculpture”’ (Aparicio, et al., 2017, p. 49)’.3 
Cézanne was a key influence, or as put by Gleizes and Metzinger: ‘He 
who understands Cézanne, is close to cubism’ (1912; cited in Herbert, 1965, 
p. 4). He, too, created volumes from flat coloured planes, and used subtle 
distortions of perspective: in Basket with Apple, Bottle, Biscuits and Fruit 
(1893), for example, the plate of biscuits is tilted towards the viewer and the 
two sides of the table do not seem to meet under the tablecloth. In a letter to 
his son, Cézanne writes: ‘Here, on the river bank, the motifs multiply, the 
same subject seen from a different angle offers a subject of the most 
compelling interest, and so varied that I believe I could keep busy for 
months without changing position but by leaning a little to the right and then 
to the left’ (Rewald, 1976, p. 324). The variations in view obtained were 
painted, together, on the canvas. Cubists took this method to extremes: 
instead of merely leaning to the right or left, they looked at objects from the 
other side or from above and, as with Cézanne, simultaneously combined 
such viewpoints in their works. Picasso and Braque acknowledged their debt 
                                                          
3 For the relation between Picasso’s paintings and sculpture, see Cowling and 
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to ‘The Master of Provence’, quoting from him in various works: the drapes 
in the proto-cubist Demoiselles d’Avignon (1907) are derived from 
Cézanne’s Female Bathers in Front of a Tent (1883–5), as are the poses of 
some of the figures (Gantefuhrer-Trier, 1996, p. 9). A wonderful episode 
recalled by Pierre Daix (1993, p. 339) expresses Picasso’s respect for 
Cézanne: ‘he informed Kahnweiler that he had “bought the Sainte-Victoire.” 
“Which one?” Kahnweiler asked, unaware of any Cezanne on the market’. 
One of Cézanne’s favourite subjects was the mountain Sainte-Victoire, close 
to his home in Provence. ‘“The real one!” Picasso was crowing with 
pleasure. He had, in fact, just bought the Chateau de Vauvenargues, whose 
grounds include the famous mountain’. 
Some of the more impenetrable works such as The Accordionist 
(1911) and Still Life with Glass and Lemon (1910) skirt close to abstraction 
or what Douglas Cooper disparagingly calls, ‘cubism’s misbegotten child’ 
(Richardson, 1959, p. 40). The objects in Still Life with Liquor Bottle (1909) 
were so inscrutable that they were not identified until 1971, from a sketch in 
which Picasso drew the real objects.4 Still Life with Glasses and Bottle 
(1912) was also for ten years mistakenly called The Battleship after an 
exhibition catalogue compiler presumably took the table top with glasses to 
be the deck of a ship with cannons (actually quite a plausible reading in the 
absence of a title) (Kahng et al., 2011, p. 49). Cubism is a key stage on the 
path to what some see as the ultimate end-point of modernism, that of 
abstraction, and cubism had influenced early abstract artists such as 
                                                          
4 See Karmel (2017, p. 130). Picasso also, apparently, did not remember years later 
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Mondrian and Malevich to break free from representation and the vestiges 
of it in their own cubist works. Picasso and Braque, though, were 
vehemently ‘realist’. Their distortions may presage surrealism and 
abstraction to come, but, as Cooper puts it, they were wholeheartedly 
engaged in ‘solving the strictly pictorial problem arising out of their 
intention to find a wholly new and precise way of recreating tangible reality 
on canvas’ (Cooper, 1971, p. 62). Viewers are aided by triggers or 
signposts—or what Picasso called ‘attributes’ (Gilot & Lake, 1964, pp. 65–
6)—that enable us to orientate ourselves with respect to the shimmering 
facets and thus appreciate the subject matter of these works.5 Carefully 
placed amidst the ‘cognitive fog’ (Baxandall, 1994) of otherwise inscrutable 
configurations of facets and scaffolding we find a coat button, guitar strings, 
the f-holes of violins, cigarette smoke, an ear lobe or eyelid, a quiff of hair, 
or a segment of lemon. An anecdote recalled by John Richardson nicely 
captures Picasso’s attitude to abstraction: ‘People who urged Picasso to look 
                                                          
5 Kahnweiler claims ‘The object once “recognized” in the painting is now “seen” 
with a perspicuity of which no illusionistic art is capable’ (1920, p. 12). Gombrich (1959, p. 
263), however, is somewhat unimpressed by cubist claims to realism: ‘Cubists…kicked 
aside the whole tradition of faithful vision and tried to start again with the “real object” 
which they squashed against the picture plane. One can enjoy the resulting confusion of 
telescoped images as commentary on the unresolved complexities of vision without 
accepting the claim that they represent reality more really than a picture based on projective 
geometry’—Gombrich, here, echoing an early uncomprehending review of an exhibition of 
Picasso’s drawings at the Stafford Gallery, London (1912), in which a reviewer quipped 
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more favourably on abstract art because it was the pictorial equivalent of 
music would be told “That’s why I don’t like music”’ (Richardson, 1996, p. 
165).6,7 
Cubists have been interpreted as Kantians by, amongst others, 
Kahnweiler, Roger Fry and Clement Greenberg (1960). There are several 
features of their works that are seen as Kantian, including the attempt to 
capture things-in-themselves, and their alleged formal autonomy, to which I 
will return below. Kahnweiler also uses Kantian terminology to delineate 
two phases of cubism. The analytic phase, that upon which I focus here, 
involved the analysis of objects into facets, whereas, from 1912 on, the goal 
of synthetic cubism was not the depiction of objects in the world, but the 
creation of new aspects of reality. Tableau-objets were created using collage 
and papier collé; the latter are canvases to which pasted paper is added, 
whereas collage includes a wider range of materials such as, in Picasso’s 
                                                          
6 Semiotic interpretations of cubism take cubist pictures not to represent via 
resemblance, but via arbitrary signs. This is not a convincing interpretation of analytic 
cubism given the clear, albeit fragmented, appearances that are presented. It is, though, a 
more plausible interpretation of synthetic cubism, as suggested by Gertrude Stein: ‘From 
1914 to 1917 cubism changed to rather flat surfaces, it was no longer sculptural, it was 
writing’ (1938, p. 39). For a sophisticated account of the semiotic interpretation, see 
Florman (2017), who argues that cubism does not involve a ‘full-blown (non-iconic) 
language’, just the ‘promise’ of one (p. 54). 
7 Cf. Gris: ‘A picture with no representational purpose is to my mind always an 
incomplete technical exercise, for the only purpose of any picture is to achieve 
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works, cane seating, sand, and rubber gloves: paintings of cluttered tables 
could now include real newspapers.  
The Kantian terminology, though, is misleading: it does not mark the 
semantic distinction that it does in Kant, with analytic judgements true in 
virtue of the meaning of the terms in which such judgements are couched, as 
opposed to synthetic judgements which are true in virtue of the nature of the 
world. Kahnweiler and others have therefore been accused of simply name-
dropping, basking, as Cheetham snipes, in the ‘cachet that high-powered 
German metaphysics lends to cubism’ (Cheetham, 2001, p. 83). 
 
2. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism 
 
Some see cubist works as moving away from fleeting appearances and 
engaging with a more profound or deep reality, that corresponding to Kant’s 
noumenal world and transcendental things-in-themselves. This is the 
‘idealist’ or ‘conceptual’ interpretation of cubism, one adopted by various 
contemporaries of Picasso and Braque, including the art dealer Léonce 
Rosenberg, poets Pierre Reverdy and Olivier Hourcade, and the critic 
Maurice Raynal. I suggest, though, that it is not illuminating to think of 
cubism in this way.8 In this paper I am focusing, apart from some thoughts 
                                                          
8This is, though, the explicit intention of artists such as Kandinsky and Klee: 
‘Formerly we used to represent things visible on earth, things we either liked to look at or 
would have liked to see. Today we reveal the reality that is behind visible things, thus 
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on formalism in §5 below, on Kantian interpretations that draw on The 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781) rather than on those concerning the 
specifically aesthetic themes in his Critique of Judgement (1790), such as 
disinterestedness and free play. 
First, it would appear that some of these interpreters have a confused 
understanding of Kant. Kahnweiler, for example, also related cubism to 
John Locke’s (1689) distinction between primary and secondary qualities: 
Picasso’s aim, he says, is ‘to present the primary…qualities as exactly as 
possible’ (1920, p. 12). Lockean primary qualities are those whose existence 
is independent of the existence of a perceiver, such as shape and size. 
Secondary qualities such as colour, smell and felt texture depend on the 
existence of a perceiver and are not possessed by objects themselves: the 
haystacks that Monet painted at sunset (1890–91) were not themselves 
golden, but the physical composition of their surface, and the particular way 
this surface reflects light rays into our eyes, causes in us the experience of 
seeing this colour. Impressionists painted the fleeting images and plays of 
light that strike the viewer; cubists, in contrast, can be seen as focusing on 
primary qualities, those that constitute the volume of objects and the 
relations between these volumes. Colours were muted—only there to depict 
form and volume; visual effects, as Lockean secondary qualities, were of 
little interest. In order to depict this primary reality, Picasso and Braque 
were not restricted to reproducing the natural effects of light. It was used 
where it was needed, as one might explore a large sculpture or a building in 
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the dark with a flashlight; some figures also had an inner light, diffusing out 
between overlapped planes and facets.9  
Such a Lockean account, though, is incompatible with the Kantian 
picture. For Locke, primary qualities such as the shape, size and sculptural 
form of an object are mind-independent, whereas, for Kant, as we shall see 
in the next section, these are mind-dependent properties. It is tempting also 
to see other ‘idealist’ interpretations in terms of Locke’s distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities, and not as Kantian. Rivière claims ‘[t]he 
true purpose of painting is to represent objects as they really are; that is to 
say, differently from the way we see them. It tends always to give us their 
sensitive essence, their presence, this is why the image it forms does not 
resemble their appearance’ (Fry, 1978, p. 76). In tilting a glass to the viewer 
the painter represents the objective, circular shape of the object in space, 
rather than how it appears from a particular perspective. In doing so, it can 
be said that the focus is on ‘reality’, the object’s ‘essence’ or the ‘thing-in-
                                                          
9 Rivière (1912, pp. 253–6) explains the cubist attitude to lighting: ‘Lighting is not 
merely an accidental mark; it has the effect of profoundly altering forms…. It is therefore 
possible to say that lighting prevents things from appearing as they are…. In short, the 
painter, instead of showing the object as he sees it, that is, disarticulated between light and 
dark, will construct it, as it is, that is, in the form of a geometrical volume, free of lighting 
effects. In the place of its relief, he will put its volume’. Rivière is similarly insightful with 
respect to perspective: ‘No doubt, reality shows us these objects mutilated in that way. But 
we can move around in reality: one step to the right and one step to the left complete our 
vision. The knowledge we have of an object is, as we said, a complex sum of perceptions. 
The plastic image, for its part, does not move: it must be complete from the first glance. 
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itself’. Such terms, though, need not be taken in a Kantian sense; they could 
merely refer to the objective, primary properties of objects in Locke’s 
sense.10  
A second reason to reject this idealist interpretation is that, for Kant, 
things-in-themselves cannot be the objects of experience, nor can we have 
any knowledge of them or cognitive contact with them. We can only have 
knowledge of the phenomenal world, the world of our experience, and not 
the transcendental world from which, presumably, these experiences are 
derived. Any attempt to depict the noumenal world is impossible.  
Third, in later works Picasso adopts a pluralist approach where, within 
the same work, there are cubist representations alongside naturalistic, 
traditional ones. This is so, for example, in Fruit-Dish with Grapes, Glass 
and Playing-card (1914) and Still Life with Fruit-Dish on a Table (1914).11 
This suggests that cubism does not aspire to the one true representation of 
reality—to a representation of things-in-themselves. The message of these 
works seems to be that these styles are complementary (Cooper, 1971, pp. 
215–17).12 Braque’s trompe l’oeil nail in his Violin and Palette (1909) 
                                                          
10 Bois (1990, p. 67) notes a parallel tension in Raynal, who interprets cubism in 
terms of both Kant and Berkeley (1710); Kant, though, attempts to refute Berkeley’s 
idealism in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781). 
11 See Cooper and Tinterow (1983, pp. 300–2). 
12 See also Amédée Ozenfant, the cubist, and later purist: ‘Because Picasso 
nowadays paints cubist and representational works, it has been falsely claimed that he is 
giving up Cubism…. Can such people not understand that Cubism and figurative painting 
are two different languages, and that a painter is free to choose either of them as he may 
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draws attention to the contrast between naturalism and cubism, and 
Rosenberg interprets this as saying that ‘the Cubist means of 
recording…reality—unlike the means devised by the Renaissance—are not 
absolute but relative. One pictorial language is no more “real” than another, 
for the nail, conceived as external reality, is just as false as any of the less 
illusionistic passages in the canvas—or, conversely, conceived as art, is just 
as true’ (Rosenblum, 2001, p. 45).13 This pluralist claim is illustrated in 
Picasso’s drawing, The Studio (1933).14 In the depicted artist’s studio there 
are two artistic representations of the same female model, one a broadly 
naturalistic sketch resting on an easel, the other a balloon-like sculpture sat 
on a table, the latter in the style of his beach paintings of the 1920s and 
1930s. 
 
3. Kant’s Empirical Realism 
 
Kahnweiler may be confused about the distinction between the views of 
Locke and Kant, and his use of the analytic/synthetic distinction may be 
mere name-dropping; nevertheless, there are other appeals to Kant that are 
more convincing. He says, for example, that cubism’s   
 
new language has given painting an unprecedented freedom… 
                                                          
13 For further discussion of this famous nail, see Rubin (1989, pp. 40–1, 60n86): 
‘his nail is a subtle artistic pun, which draws attention to the premises of his Cubist style by 
alluding to what it is not’ (p. 41).  
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coloured planes, through their direction and relative position, can 
bring together the formal scheme without uniting in closed forms….  
Instead of an analytic description, the painter can…also create in this 
way a synthesis of the object, or in the words of Kant, ‘put together 
the various conceptions and comprehend their variety in our 
perception’. (Kahnweiler, 1920, p. 12) 
 
Here he is concerned with the creative role of the mind in perception. This is 
also stressed by other commentators and by le bande à Picasso (Picasso’s 
circle of poet and artist friends). Apollinaire claimed that ‘[c]ubism differs 
from earlier painting in that it is not an art of imitation, but an art of 
imagination’ (Gantefuhrer-Trier, 1996, p. 20) and that it involves ‘the art of 
painting new structures with elements borrowed not from visual reality but 
from the reality of knowledge’ (Cooper, 1971, p. 109). There is a shallow 
sense in which this is so. Our knowledge of the human body and of 
traditional ways of depicting this allow us to see, for example, the figure in 
Picasso’s Standing Nude of 1910. Such a figure is not in itself ‘closed’ (see 
Kahnweiler quotation above)—its form and the space around it 
interpenetrate; it is, however, ‘completed’ in the viewer’s mind. We have to 
apply such knowledge to the drawing since the descriptive content of such a 
work is so minimal.15  
                                                          
15 It is in this move away from visual appearances and towards the involvement of 
cognitive capacities that we see one influence of tribal art on cubism. Golding, echoing the 
now archaic terminology of the cubist epoch, puts it thus: ‘As opposed to Western art, 
Negro art is more conceptual, much less conditioned by visual appearances. The Negro 
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There is, though, according to Kant, a deeper sense in which the mind 
constructs what we see and this, I argue, can provide the basis for a distinct 
Kantian interpretation of cubism, one not focused on things-in-themselves, 
but on Kant’s empirical realism and his account of the cognitive input that is 
necessary for our lived experience. 
Early modern empiricists such as Locke and Hume saw experience as 
passive, something that impinges on us. Hume calls such experiences, 
impressions; the world forming impressions on the mind as a stamp forms 
an impression in wax. Kant, however, in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ 
(1781, A22–49/B37–73), argues that the mind imposes spatio-temporal 
order on experience.16 Space and time are not things independent of us; they 
are preconditions of experience—necessary, a priori, aspects of experience 
through which we must engage with the world; what Kant calls ‘forms of 
intuition’. Kant has two arguments for this claim. First, the idea of space 
cannot be derived from impressions (in Hume’s sense) since spatiality is 
already built into our impressions: I see that the glass is to the left of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
59). Karmel (2003, p. 68) cites Kahnweiler’s (1949) thoughts on the creative role of the 
viewer’s mind in relation to a Grebo tribal mask: ‘The volume of the “seen” face is 
inscribed nowhere in the “true” mask, which provides only the outline of this face. The 
volume is seen somewhere before the real mask. The epidermis of the seen face only exists 
in the consciousness of the viewer who “imagines” or creates the volume of the face in 
front of the plane surface of the mask’. Picasso owned two Grebo masks (see Rubin, 1984, 
p. 307).  
16 ‘Aesthetic’ is used here to refer to the sensible or experiential representation of 
objects in general (cf. anaesthetic) and not in the contemporary sense that refers only to art 
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newspaper. Second, I can think of space with objects removed, but I cannot 
think of the absence of space; representation of space is thus prior to 
representation of objects (ibid., A23–24/B38–9). Further, in the 
‘Transcendental Deduction’ (ibid., A95–130/B129–69) Kant argues that 
experience must also correspond to the ‘categories’—certain fundamental 
ways of conceiving of the world. We have no choice, for example, but to see 
the world in terms of enduring substances in causal relations to each other. 
In what follows I will focus on the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and the 
spatial structure of experience. 
Commentators on cubism gesture towards such an account: ‘The 
arrangement of bottles and fishes [in Braque’s Still Life with Fish on a 
Table, 1911] is not embedded in a spatially recognizable background…. 
Spatial integration of the objects in the picture develops only in the viewers’ 
minds’ (Gantefuhrer-Trier, 1996, p. 42). The viewer fuses multiple views 
into a single image, reconstructing objects from dislocated facets, bringing 
to bear their conceptual understanding of those objects. Braque, in his 1917 
Thoughts and Reflections on Art, says ‘[t]he senses deform, the mind forms’ 
(cited in Verstegen, 2014, p. 295), and a more developed description of the 
constructive role of the mind is given by the cubist sculptor, Archipenko: 
‘One can say that Cubism had created a new cognitive order in respect of 
pictures…. [T]he viewer is himself creatively active, and speculates and 
creates a picture by building upon the plastic character of those objects that 
are sketched out as forms’ (Gantefuhrer-Trier, 1996, p. 30). Such 
constructive effort can be felt as one searches for life in the more difficult 
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not that cubist works have distinctive features that trigger such Kantian 
synthesis; for Kant, all experience has this structure: apprehending a teapot 
actively involves forms of intuition and the categories. The teapot does not 
sit there in space that is independent of observers, waiting to be seen. Space, 
rather—and thus volume—is a precondition of experience—a feature 
imposed on experience by the mind of the viewer. The claim is that cubist 
works can make us aware of such acts of synthesis, and therefore that such 
an account of visual experience can be seen as one of the subjects of these 
works.17 Cubists are not alone in this, of course, and Cezanne, divisionists 
such as Seurat and Signac, and impressionists all have this goal, but the 
claim here is that the self-reflexivity of cubism’s form of modernism is 
Kantian in flavour. 
I will discuss two potential objections to my interpretation. First, one 
concerning a distinct account of what Kant means by things-in-themselves; 
second, a reason to think that such a Kantian approach could not have been 
intended by the major cubists. 
 
4. The Two-Aspect Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism 
                                                          
17 For Kant, such synthesis is also the foundation of self-awareness. Kant argues 
that self-consciousness—or the ‘unity of apperception’ (1781, A106–8)—is grounded in 
acts of synthesis: I become aware of myself as I synthesize spatio-temporal intuitions into, 
for example, the experience of seeing someone descending the stairs. Perhaps, then, cubism 
not only makes manifest the active cognitive input that we bring to experience, but also the 
very existence of our selves. One does not lose oneself in a cubist picture; one finds 
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The idealist interpretation of cubism that I discussed in the previous section 
assumes what is called the ‘two-object’ view: there’s the spatio-temporal 
objects of experience and also transcendental or noumenal objects that are 
not located in space and time. Cubist works are seen as attempting to depict 
the latter or as enabling us to comprehend the noumenal. There is, however, 
another interpretation of what Kant has in mind by things-in-themselves. 
This is Allison’s (1987) ‘two-aspect’ view. According to this, we have two 
ways of conceiving of objects: in spatio-temporal terms, as they are 
experienced, and also as objects-in-themselves, shorn of the spatio-temporal 
properties that our mind imposes on them. According to this view, there is 
just one set of objects conceived in two distinct ways, and not an 
accompanying mysterious world of noumenal objects.  
A ‘two-aspect’ interpretation of cubism is suggested by considering 
the density of the clustering of facets across a cubist work. There are areas, 
often ‘seeded’, as it were, by an attribute, where facets form recognizable 
objects, and there are impenetrable areas of the canvas where it is difficult to 
discern such features. We can talk of the former as resolved parts of the 
canvas and the latter as unresolved. These distinctive regions illustrate the 
two distinct aspects of objects central to the two-aspect interpretation. 
Cubist works can be seen as concerning the familiar objects of experience: 
both, as they are experienced—in the resolved parts of the canvas, and, as 
they are in-themselves, in the penumbras and regions of unresolved 
shimmering facets. This would be an idealist interpretation of cubism, one 
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objects, but with those of the transcendental aspects of familiar everyday 
objects. Such an interpretation is not prey to some of the problems discussed 
above. On this view, for example, there is a sense in which things-in-
themselves can be experienced (one aspect of them, at least). 
My interpretation differs from this two-aspect reading. I am claiming 
that cubist works bring to our attention the acts of synthesis involved in 
perception—this is their subject, and not the transcendentally-ideal aspects 
of the objects of experience. I suggest that my interpretation is more 
plausible. First, consider the regions of the paintings where facets form 
familiar objects of experience. According to the two-aspect interpretation, 
the depicted facets should be seen as, as it were, falling or shearing away, 
revealing the transcendental aspects of such objects; according to my 
interpretation, the facets should be seen as participating in the construction 
of the spatio-temporal objects we come to see. The latter description chimes 
more with my experience of looking at these works. Second, the explicit 
pronouncements of some cubists lend some support to my interpretation. 
We saw above that Braque and Archipenko focus on the constructive role of 
the mind and not on transcendental objects, either as construed according to 
the two-object or two-aspect interpretations. 
 
5. ‘Picasso Never Spoke of Kant’ 
 
Such consideration of the explicit statements of the major cubists can 
suggest a second objection to my empirical realist interpretation of Kant. 
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may be suggestive (‘the senses deform, the mind forms’), but further 
consideration of the intentions of Picasso and Braque may be thought to 
undermine all Kantian interpretations of their work. According to Paul 
Crowther: ‘the internal structure of Cubist works should not even be linked 
analogically to Kant’s “synthesis of apprehension”—unless we have 
external documentary evidence to show that the artist intended 
his…representation to be thus construed’ (1987, p. 198). We do not have 
any such evidence. In fact, it is highly unlikely that Picasso and Braque read 
Kant or that they had anything but a very rudimentary understanding of his 
works. Kahnweiler, questioning the veracity of Francoise Gilot’s (1964) 
account of life with Picasso, asserts that ‘Picasso never, never spoke of Kant 
or Plato’ (Ashton, 1972, p. xxvii). Both his partner during the cubist years, 
Fernande Olivier, and Gertrude Stein attest that Picasso did not read much at 
all, apart from, perhaps, some of the poetry of his friends (Rubin, 1989, pp. 
54–5). Further, both Picasso and Braque explicitly stated that they were not 
driven by philosophical or theoretical concerns and Picasso, in particular, 
seemed to delight in obfuscating his intentions when directly asked about 
his work—or, as Cocteau (1956, p. 93) put it: ‘He never dissected the doves 
that came out of his sleeves’.  
Crowther’s claim, though, is too strong and not very plausible, as I 
will go on to argue. A plausible position with respect to the relation between 
an artist’s intentions and knowledge and the meaning or subject of their art 
would seem to occupy the middle ground between Crowther’s claim and 
that of Beardsley and Wimsatt (1946) who argue that the intentions of the 
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what it is about. I myself have searched biographies and interviews with 
Picasso to find mention of Kant. What if I had been successful—what if I 
had fallen upon a well-thumbed copy of The Critique of Pure Reason in one 
of David Douglas Duncan’s wonderful photographs of Picasso’s home and 
studio, La Californie?18 This would surely add credence to one or other 
Kantian interpretations of his work. However, according to Beardsley and 
Wimsatt, if Picasso had been successful in his intention to depict Kantian 
themes, then they would be there to be seen in the work, regardless of the 
existence of such a photograph. If, on the other hand, he were unsuccessful, 
and his reading of the critique never came through in his work, then he 
would have failed in his intentions and such a photograph would merely be 
a record of a failed project. There is, however, middle ground between these 
two views concerning the relevance of artists’ intentions to the meanings of 
their works. Instead of limiting consideration to the explicit intentions of the 
artist, we can consider wider aspects of the creative process. Knowledge of 
these may illuminate the works. An artist—Picasso, perhaps—could have a 
sharper awareness than most of us of his own perceptual mechanisms and 
the synthetic activity of his own mind. That is at least an open possibility. 
The artist’s representations of what and how he sees could therefore 
manifest features of perception that we rarely notice, but are those that are 
explained by scientific, psychological or philosophical theory. It may also 
be the artist’s intention to express their perceptual insight in their works 
even though they do not have knowledge of the relevant theories. Picasso 
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could thus portray Kantian synthesis without having read a word of Kant.  
I have considered various ways that interpreters have taken cubism to 
be Kantian in its approach. It has been seen in terms of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction and transcendental idealism. I have rejected both interpretations, 
but suggested an alternative interpretation in line with Kant’s empirical 
realism. Lastly, I shall relate this interpretation to formalist interpretations of 
cubism—formalism derived from Kant’s (1790) account of beauty in his 
Critique of Judgment. Formalist interpretations of cubist works limit their 
aesthetically-significant properties to the planes, lines and muted colours on 
the surface of the canvas. Roger Fry offered an early influential account of 
this kind: cubists ‘do not seek to imitate form, but to create form; not to 
imitate life, but to find an equivalent for life…. The logical extreme of such 
a method would undoubtedly be the attempt to give up all resemblance to 
natural form, and to create a purely abstract language of form—a visual 
music; and the latter works of Picasso show this clearly enough’ (Rubin, 
1989, p. 406). However, the richness of these works belies such 
interpretations. Abstract art may be limited to such formal properties, but, as 
we have seen, cubism is not abstract: it can therefore be judged on how well 
it captures the atmosphere of the café or the character of a person, as, by all 
accounts, he evidently did in his portraits of the art dealers Ambroise 
Vollard (1910) and Wilhelm Uhde (1910). To understand cubism one also 
has to be aware of its subversive role with respect to Renaissance 
perspective, and its relation to a roll-call of artists through the ages to which 
Picasso, in particular, makes reference: Cézanne, El Greco, Courbet and 
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concern the process of seeing and Kantian conceptions of this. Cubist works 
do have a distinctive form, one that at times offers a kind of shimmering 
beauty—a ‘prismatic magic’: ‘As cubism evolves, Picasso presses his 
analysis beyond the study of volumes to the point at which it becomes “a 
melodius fabric of lines and tints, a music of delicate tones—lighter or 
darker, warmer or cooler—whose mystery increases the pleasure of the 
viewer”’ (Rubin, 1989, p. 44). In addition to this form, though, there is 
multi-faceted content: a certain work can depict the bohemian world of zinc 
bars in Paris at the start of the last century, art-historical themes concerning 
perspective and the norms of realism, and philosophical theories concerning 
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